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without development on the area for which cancellation was
asked may have been an influential factor though it was not
stated to have been. The fact that by the terms of the contract
the lessee might discard unwonted acreage and reduce land
rentals while keeping what it wanted without development is
well stressed. Again, that upon cancellation in whole or in part
for any reason, a producing well and 160 acres of land might be
held is a convincing answer to the lessee's plea of indivisibility
of lease. The facts of the former cases holding for indivisibility
of lease, under theory of indivisibility of obligation to drill a
well are easily distinguished in fact but not so readily in doc-
trine. Be that as it may, this decision is most heartening, par-
ticularly to those who have had difficulty in assimilating the
mysteries of indivisibility of lease in some previous cases-when
met with others dealing with assignment of part of the acreage.
Active breach by refusal to comply with demand, requiring
no putting in default, is well illustrated by the instant case.
Revised Statutes 30:102 having been complied with by lessor,
award of reasonable attorney's fees obviously followed.
Torts and Workmen's Compensation
Wex S. Malone*
TORTS
Negligence
Standard of care. Courts generally agree that it is the duty
of the physician, surgeon or dentist to exercise the degree of
skill ordinarily employed, under similar circumstances, by the
members of his profession in good standing in the same locality,
and to use reasonable care and diligence, along with his best
judgment, in the application of his skill to the case. Two ideas
are implicit in this definition of the professional standard of
conduct: First, the standard of skill is that of a complex and
erudite profession. It is conceded that the medical layman, in-
cluding even the judge, is incapable of passing an intelligent
judgment on such matters and that there must be resort to
medically expert opinion which will likely be determinative in
each controversy. Second, the element of care and diligence
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
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(as distinguished from skill) is gauged simply by the term
''reasonable." This suggests that the trier is entitled to more
latitude and that he can draw from his own experience and
judgment in evaluating the attentiveness and diligence of the
physician or surgeon. No judge or jury could attempt to deter-
mine for itself whether a diagnosis of a complicated disease
was acceptable or unacceptable within the medical profession.
If, however, an attending physician were to drop a bottle of
nitric acid on a patient during a course of treatment, if a sur-
geon were to open a window during the course of an operation
so that flies and insects entered an incision, or if the surgeon's
knife were to slip and sever healthy tissue, no judge would
hesitate to rely upon his own good judgment in asserting that
there was negligence. The attempt to distinguish those pieces
of alleged professional conduct which must be judged through
medical expertise and those which can be subjected to the
homely scrutiny of "ordinary care" is a difficult matter, and
judges have frequently disagreed.
This kind of disagreement brought about six separate hear-
ings in Meyer v. St. Paul-Mercury Indemnity Company.' Plain-
tiff was referred by her dentist to an oral surgeon for the ex-
traction of all her teeth. A cursory examination indicated one
obviously loose tooth. She was placed under ether by the anes-
thetist. The plan for anesthetization was nasal indotracheal
intubation, which requires that a tube be inserted through the
nose and seated behind the trachea. In order to guide the
tube and insure its proper placement it is necessary to insert
through the mouth a large illuminating device known as a
laryngoscope, which occupies almost the entire opening between
the lips. When the laryngoscope was withdrawn the anesthetist
discovered that a tooth had been forced from its socket and had
lodged in the lung. A suit was brought in which negligence of
the surgeon and the anesthetist was alleged.
The basic point of difference between the majority and the
minority, both on the original hearing and the rehearing, was
whether the judge was free to exercise his own judgment in
determining the negligence of the surgeon and anesthetist or
whether the complete absence of any expert testimony suggest-
ing carelessness must be accepted as conclusive. The majority
held that the accident resulted from the laryngoscope's coming
1. 225 La. 618, 73 So.2d 781 (1953), Justices Ponder, McCaleb, and Moise
dissenting.
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into contact with the upper front teeth, which, according to
the experts, was impossible to avoid. Judgment for defendant
was accordingly affirmed. In view of the fact that in situations
of this kind matters of expert knowledge and skill are inex-
tricably intervolved with matters of common knowledge and
observation, it is not surprising that substantial differences of
opinion will exist. The Meyer case can be profitably compared
with a California decision, Brown v. Shortlidge,2 where re-
covery was allowed under very similar circumstances.
Duties toward children. An increasing respect for the safety
of young children is apparent in the torts decisions throughout
the nation. The most obvious illustration is, of course, the cre-
ation and expansion of the attractive nuisance doctrine so as to
afford some protection to trespassing children against highly
dangerous conditions attractive to them. Where the child is not
a trespasser there is discoverable a corresponding liberality
in determining what is to be regarded as negligent conduct.
A recent illustration of this. is Jackson v. Jones.3 Jones, a con-
tractor who was completing the construction of a gymnasium
on public school property in Baton Rouge, piled salvaged lum-
ber near the playground. In a piece of this lumber was a nail
which lacerated the leg of plaintiff, a seven-year old first-
grade pupil who was pushed by a playmate during a game of
follow-the-leader upon the lumber pile. The trial court denied
that the evidence indicated the presence of a nail as claimed.
It also found that the seven-year old child was guilty of con-
tributory negligence by violating instructions of the school
authorities to keep away from the lumber pile. Finally, the
trial court held that the act of a playmate in pushing the plain-
tiff intervened and prevented the conduct of the defendant from
being the proximate cause of injury. All these findings were
regarded as erroneous by the Supreme Court, which reversed
the judgment and remanded the case.
One of the chief arguments to support defendant's conten-
tention that it was not negligent was that the defendant con-
sulted with the principal of the school over the advisability of
erecting an enclosure for the lumber. This suggestion was
abandoned because they both felt that such a structure might
create additional dangers. The principal proposed, instead, to
warn the children. The Supreme Court observed that such an
2. 98 Cal. App. 352 (1929).
3. 224 La. 403, 69 So.2d 729 (1953).
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attempted delegation would not absolve defendant of responsi-
bility if the precaution proved to be inadequate. It further
announced that a child of seven years is incapable of contrib-
utory negligence in the absence of a showing of extraordinary
conditions. With reference to the intervening act of the play-
mate it was sufficient to observe that if the occurrence of an
accident of this kind was foreseeable, it is immaterial that there
was an intervening act of a third person which contributed to
the result.
Contributory negligence. Although a guest in an automo-
bile is not required to keep an affirmative watchout for danger
in order to avoid being charged with contributory negligence,
yet it would seem that if he actively participates in the driv-
ing of the vehicle by instructing the driver or making sugges-
tions as to the management of the car, he should be held to
the standard of ordinary care. However, the Supreme Court
dealt with such a back seat driver with extreme liberality in
a recent decision.4 Plaintiff was the husband of the driver. The
car was trailing a truck driven by the defendant, and as the
car approached a curve the plaintiff advised the driver to pass
this truck as soon as the way was clear. After the curve was
negotiated he urged her to pass. Directly ahead was an inter-
section and the usual yellow line on the highway warning
against overtaking at this place. The truck attempted to turn
into the intersection just as the wife was passing, and a col-
lision followed. Both the defendant and the plaintiff's wife were
found negligent. The court held, however, that the husband's
conduct was no more than annoying backseat driving, and that
the wife should have ignored his urging. Hence he was not pre-
cluded from recovery by his contributory negligence. The opin-
ion made the surprising observation that the husband did not
know, nor should he have known, of the intersection's presence.
It seems to this writer, however, that once the guest undertakes
to interject his advice and urgings into the operation of the car,
he should make the reasonable observations necessary to assure
himself that the advice he is giving is not dangerous. 5 If the
purpose of relieving the quiescent passenger of any duty to watch
out is to discourage backseat driving, the position taken in the
instant case can plausibly have the opposite effect. The obser-
vation that the driver was experienced and should have known
4. Herget v. Saucier, 223 La. 938, 67 So.2d 543 (1953).
5. Solomon v. Davis Bus Line, Inc., 1 So.2d 816 (La. App. 1941).
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better has little bearing on an evaluation of the conduct of the
guest husband. Perhaps the best explanation of the decision is
the fact that the defense of contributory negligence is becom-
ing increasingly unpopular.
Defamation and Malicious Prosecution
At common law the action for libel affords little protection
against the person who files false and derogatory criminal
charges against another. There is an absolute privilege con-
ferred by law for all pertinent statements made during the
course of a judicial proceeding.0 In such instances the only
appropriate remedy is the suit for malicious prosecution. The
privilege to prosecute or file criminal proceedings, unlike the
privilege to defame, protects the defendant only where there
is probable cause for the charges which were made and further
where he was not actuated by malice. In the suit for malicious
prosecution, however, the plaintiff is obliged to show that the
criminal proceeding was disposed of favorably to him. This
showing, of course, is not necessary in the ordinary suit for
libel and slander.7 In Louisiana, where statements made in the
course of a judicial proceeding may be actionable as libels or
slanders, and where the privilege in such cases is qualified,
rather than absolute, the distinction between the torts of defa-
mation and malicious prosecution is virtually non-existent.
Irrespective of the theory adopted by the plaintiff, he may
recover by showing that the affidavit or prosecution was false
and that it was made maliciously and without probable cause.8
This was pointed out recently in Acme Stores v. Better Business
Bureau of Baton Rouge.0 Presumably, in Louisiana the plain-
tiff, irrespective of the theory he adopts, will recover the ex-
pense of defending the criminal proceeding and any damages
for imprisonment he may have suffered, in addition to damages
for injury to his reputation. The chief practical effect of con-
solidating the torts of malicious prosecution and libel is that
it is no longer necessary for the plaintiff to show that the crimi-
nal proceeding instigated against him terminated in his favor.
Several other cases considered by the Supreme Court are
not discussed herein because they made no appreciable con-
6. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 587 (1938).
7. Harper, Malicious Prosecution, False Imprisonment and Defamation,
15 TEXAS L. Rmv. 157 (1937).
8. Waldo v. Morrison, 220 La. 1006, 58 So.2d 210 (1952).
9. 74 So.2d 43 (La. 1954).
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tribution to the jurisprudence.', Several were decisions upon
the findings of fact.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Accidents during Course of Employer's Business
It is frequently difficult to determine when a salesman can
be regarded as performing his duties. Sales promotion requires
many activities which are of a semi-personal or social charac-
ter but which are nevertheless undertaken partly for the purpose
of furthering the employer's business. In such cases the courts
attempt to determine whether the dominant purpose of the
undertaking was the business of the employer or the personal
pleasure of the employee. If the former is the principal pur-
pose, compensation will not be denied because of the fact that
the salesman derived personal pleasure from the same under-
taking."
In Green v. Heard Motor Company 2 deceased, a car sales-
man, had visited the Springhill Trade School for the purpose
of making contact with a prospective customer who, at the
time, was absent, but whose return was expected. While wait-
ing for the latter's arrival, Green accepted an invitation to ride
in an airplane with a third party. He was heard to observe that
he had "just as soon try to sell him an automobile as anyone
else." Green was killed when the plane crashed due to the
intoxication of the pilot. Compensation was denied in the court
of appeal,18 but this was reversed by the Supreme Court. The
opinion observed:
"Purchasers are influenced in part by intangible con-
siderations, and it is commonly known that good salesman-
ship results from a combination of factors, among which
are the creation of good will and the making of contacts.
It therefore follows that an activity engaged in with the
end in view to promoting good salesmanship is clearly a
function arising out of a salesman's employment."' 4
In evaluating this statement it should be borne in mind
10. Bergeron v. Roberson, 224 La. 932, 71 So.2d 332 (1954); Bagala v.
Kimble, 74 So.2d 172 (La. 1954) (although this case is lengthy and a rehear-
ing was granted, the dispute is entirely on the facts and the issue of negli-
gence); Ott v. Fornea, 224 La. 36, 68 So.2d 749 (1953).
11. Harkness v. Olcott-Stone Motors, 203 La. 947, 14 So.2d 773 (1943).
12. 224 La. 1077, 71 So.2d 849 (1954), 15 LOUISIANA LAW RE:v5W 482 (1955).
13. 63 So.2d 178 (La. App. 1953).
14. 224 La. 1078, 1085, 71 So.2d 849, 851 (1954).
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that Green was admittedly waiting for a customer with whom
negotiations for the sale of a car were pending at the time he
accepted the invitation to ride. In a sense, therefore, he could
be regarded as standing by when the accident occurred. Courts
have frequently held that accidents that happen while the em-
ployee is standing by in preparation for the performance of his
duties occur during the course of employment.15
The Green case certainly represents a liberal attitude toward
the extent of the course of employment. Other jurisdictions,
however, have witnessed even more extreme instances of re-
covery. See, for example, Harrison v. Stanton0 where an under-
taker's assistant was awarded compensation for injuries sus-
tained while he was driving a babysitter to her home follow-
ing a ball sponsored by the Optimists' Club, and Adams v. East
Pennsylvania Conference17 where a social-minded minister was
compensated for an eye which was lost while he was deer
hunting with members of his congregation.
Total Disability
During the last few years considerable speculation has
developed concerning the proper interpretation of total dis-
ability in some of the more recent decisions of the Supreme
Court. The storm center of dispute has been the opinion in
Morgan v. American Bitumuls Co.'s and particularly the obser-
vation by the Supreme Court in that case that a worker is not
totally disabled merely because he cannot perform the identical
duties of the employment in which he was engaged at the time
of the accident.
Two different interpretations of the Morgan decision were
possible. First, the argument has been advanced that the Su-
preme Court had indicated a retreat from the rule of the Knispel
decision as applied to all workers, both skilled and semi-skilled.
This point of view was represented by the opinion of the Court
of Appeal for Orleans in Brannon v. Zurich General Accident
and Liability Ins. Co.' 9 Brannon, a carpenter, suffered an injury to
his knee, which obliged the removal of the patella. The medical
testimony indicated that Brannon would thereafter be disabled
15. See cases cited MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW
AND PRACTICE § 164 (1951).
16. 26 N.J. Super. 194, 97 A.2d 687 (1953).
17. 49 Pa. D. & C. 61 (1943).
18. 217 La. 968, 47 So.2d 739 (1950).
19. 61 So.2d 257 (La. App. 1952).
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from, or seriously handicapped in, assuming a squatting or
kneeling position and in climbing. Despite these handicaps, the
court of appeal was of the opinion that under the rule of the
Morgan case Brannon was only partially disabled, since a worker
is not totally disabled merely because he cannot perform all
the duties of the "identical" position he held prior to the acci-
dent. It is noteworthy in passing that partial disability was
based upon the medical estimate of the extent of physical im-
pairment involved.
Prior to the hearing of Brannon's dispute by the court of
appeal, however, the Supreme Court had passed upon the case,
Wright v. National Surety Corporation,20 and the opinion in that
decision had considered the Morgan case and had indicated that
the statement that the worker is not disabled merely because
he cannot do the identical work as before the accident must be
considered in the context of the unskilled manual laborer.
Wright, the operator of an asphalt distributing machine, was
regarded by the Supreme Court as a skilled worker, and the
fact that he retained the ability to operate a light truck did not
prevent his being totally disabled where the loss of an arm
precluded the lifting operations necessary in performing his
prior work.
The Wright decision was recently referred to by the Su-
preme Court in reversing the judgment of the court of appeal
in the Brannon case.21 The opinion emphasized that Brannon
was a skilled carpenter and the fact that he could perform
some of the same operations as before the accident did not pre-
vent his being totally disabled so long as parts of his work
obligated him to endure suffering and increased the hazard to
himself and his fellow workers. The court then emphasized its
adherence to the rule of the Knispel case. It made an observa-
tion which appears to the writer to be one of the important
underlying bases of the Knispel rule-that there is no market
for the services of a carpenter who cannot do all the work of
a carpenter.
20. 221 La. 486, 59 So.2d 695 (1952).
21. Brannon v. Zurich General Accident & Liability Ins. Co., 224 La.
161, 69 So.2d 1 (1953).
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